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I. INTRODUCTION
Some National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) studentathletes of various sports and institutions have recently been instructed that they are not permitted to use certain social media platforms.1 The purported reasons causing universities to implement these bans range from interests in image control2 to pressure from the
NCAA to monitor and report potential NCAA infractions.3 However,
these bans are likely unconstitutional.4 The United States Supreme
Court has stated that a public educational institution cannot censor
speech simply because it wishes to avoid “discomfort and unpleas-



J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Florida State University College of Law; B.A. Political
Science, 2010, University of Georgia. I wish to thank Professor Nat S. Stern for his helpful
comments on earlier drafts and for his guidance regarding the connection between First
Amendment speech protections and Establishment Clause jurisprudence. I also wish to
thank my family. Their unconditional love and support sustains me. All mistakes are
my own.
1. See Bradley Shear, NCAA Student-Athlete Social Media Bans May Be
Unconstitutional,
SHEAR
ON
SOCIAL
MEDIA
LAW
(Aug.
11,
2011),
http://www.shearsocialmedia.com/2011/08/ncaa-student-athlete-social-media-bans.html.
2. Id.
3. See Bradley Shear, Does the NCAA Understand the Legal Implications of
Social Media Monitoring?, SHEAR ON SOCIAL MEDIA LAW (June 22, 2011),
http://www.shearsocialmedia.com/2011/06/does-ncaa-understand-legal-implications.html.
4. See Shear, supra note 1; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
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antness.”5 These bans are now more noticeable and have entered into
the public discussion in part because other students at the same public educational institutions are not subject to the same restrictions as
the student-athletes.6 This Note will examine the recent social media
bans and the constitutional issues they raise when public educational
institutions restrict NCAA student-athletes from logging on and
speaking out. This Note will contend that those bans that are not motivated by educational concerns are in fact unconstitutional restrictions on student-athletes’ free speech rights.
II. FOUNDATION OF FREE SPEECH PROTECTIONS FOR STUDENTS
A. Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse
The First Amendment speech protections afforded to students
have received distinct treatment by the Supreme Court.7 The Court
has noted the need for “vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms”
in school environments in order to encourage an atmosphere of learning and the sharing of ideas.8 However, the Court has also noted the
importance of maintaining an atmosphere conducive to furthering
educational pursuits and has recognized the need for school officials
to implement policies that control student behavior at schools.9 In
fact, the Court encapsulated these competing interests in one of the
most commonly quoted statements pertaining to free speech protections: “It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this
Court for almost 50 years.”10 The Court went on to say, “On the other
hand, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming
the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and
control conduct in the schools.”11
The Court’s jurisprudence concerning free speech protections in
schools has largely centered around and attempted to address the
dynamic created by these conflicting interests. The Court has established the general framework for free speech protections for students
over the course of forty years and through four major cases.12



5. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
6. See Shear, supra note 1.
7. 1 RONNA GREFF SCHNEIDER, EDUCATION LAW: FIRST AMENDMENT, DUE PROCESS
AND DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 343-45 (2004).
8. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.479, 487 (1960).
9. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 7, at 343-45.
10. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
11. Id. at 507.
12. See generally SCHNEIDER, supra note 7 (2004 & Supp. 2011).

2012]

HANDS OFF TWITTER

783

In Tinker v. Des Moines School District, the Supreme Court began
to establish what rules would be applied to determine what student
speech or expression would be protected under the First Amendment
and what would not. In the case, the Supreme Court considered student symbolic speech instead of actual, verbal speech.13 A group of
students had met outside of school and decided to wear black armbands to school as a symbol of their opposition to the Vietnam War.14
The school’s principals learned of the students’ plan before they wore
the armbands to school and implemented a policy that any student
found wearing a black armband would be asked to remove it, and if
the student refused, she would be suspended until she returned to
school without the armband.15 The students, aware of the new policy,
wore the armbands to school and were suspended after refusing to
remove the armbands.16 The school’s policy was solely aimed at the
nonverbal, symbolic speech in the form of wearing black armbands
to school.
The Court held that the school’s policy violated the students’ free
speech rights under the First Amendment.17 Justice Fortas, writing
for the Court, acknowledged the powers held by school officials in relation to controlling student conduct, so long as it did not violate
those students’ constitutional rights.18 However, the Court reasoned
that when the students wore the black armbands, it was “closely akin
to ‘pure speech’ which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment.”19 The issue the
Court faced was not whether students wholly relinquished their First
Amendment rights protecting pure speech. That question had long
been answered in the negative.20 The Court reiterated that “First
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of
the school environment, are available to teachers and students.”21
Instead, the Court was forced to consider, in the context of a unique
situation, whether those rights were curtailed in some way due to a
need to control student behavior and maintain school order.
The Court found it important to examine the nature of the students’ speech and whether it had any adverse impact or influence on
the school environment.22 The Court stated that the students did not
disrupt any classroom work, incite any violent reactions, or infringe


13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06.
Id. at 504-05.
Id. at 504.
Id.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 507.
Id. at 505-06.
Id. at 506.
Id.
Id. at 508.
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the rights of the school or any other student.23 The district court,
which had ruled that the students’ First Amendment rights had not
been violated, reasoned that the school authorities were acting reasonably when they implemented the ban because they were afraid of
a potential disturbance caused by the armbands.24 The Supreme
Court responded that “in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.”25 Though the Court held that the students’ First
Amendment rights had been violated and reaffirmed the existence of
those protections on school grounds, the Court did choose to qualify
the free speech rights of students.26 The Court stated that conduct
that “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder
or invasion of the rights of others” would be viewed differently and
would most likely not be constitutionally protected.27
Tinker remained the sole standard for free speech and expression
protections until the Supreme Court decided Bethel School District
No. 403 v. Fraser28 in 1986.29 In Fraser, the Court’s decision described
a less protective standard for student speech.30 In the case, a student
prepared a speech nominating his friend for an office in student government.31 The student’s speech relied on sexual innuendo as entertainment, and teachers advised the student that his speech was inappropriate and that he should not deliver it.32 The student ignored
the advice, delivered the speech to approximately 600 students, and
was subsequently suspended from school.33
The Court distinguished this speech from the type in Tinker by
noting that this student was suspended because he gave a lewd
speech in front of the student body, while the students in Tinker were
suspended for expressing a political viewpoint.34 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, reasoned that while this type of speech
probably would have been protected in other (adult) forums, it was
exactly the type of speech whose content (offensive sexual innuendo)
was not appropriate for its forum, a school.35 This notion of speech or
expression and the forum in which it is spoken or expressed is an important consideration in determining if the speech is protected or un-


23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 510.
Id. at 513.
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
SCHNEIDER, supra note 7, at 350.
See id.
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677-78.
Id.
Id. at 677.
Id. at 685.
Id. at 682-83.
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protected. The Court emphasized the societal role that schools fill in
teaching students the value of civility and the undermining nature of
lewd and offensive speech.36 The Court also noted that the speech had
created a noticeable disturbance in the school, but it focused mainly
on the speech itself as opposed to the reaction the speech engendered.37 Though it is slight, this is an important distinction. The Court
pointed to the negative effect the speech had on students mostly as proof
of the offensive quality of the speech.38 The implication is that even if
student speech does not cause a disruption, it may still be restricted if it
is offensive enough to the school environment.39
Thus, the Court reasoned that because the student’s speech was
inappropriate for the forum and not a political viewpoint (like the
speech in Tinker), it was not protected speech.40 The Court held that
“[t]he First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as [the student’s] would undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”41
In Hazelwood Independent School District v. Kuhlmeier,42 two
years after Fraser, the Court addressed the issue of school-sponsored
speech and what degree of First Amendment protection it should receive. In Hazelwood, a school principal drew the ire of students when
he removed two articles from the school-sponsored and studentwritten newspaper before the articles were to be published.43 One article told the story of a pregnant student, and while the story did not
reveal the student’s identity, the principal believed that the other
details made the student’s identity clear.44 The other article offered a
negative view of the father of another student, and the newspaper had
not given the father an opportunity to respond or to consent to the
publication of the article.45
Most importantly, the Court distinguished these circumstances
from those found in Tinker and Fraser on the basis that those cases
dealt with “personal” speech while Hazelwood was concerned with
“school-sponsored . . . expressive activities.”46 Justice White, writing
for the majority, focused on the predicament schools face when dealing with student speech that could possibly be perceived as the view-


36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 681-86.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 678.
Id. at 685.
Id.
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
Id. at 262-63.
Id. at 263.
Id.
Id. at 271.
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point of the school.47 Justice White described this as speech or expression that “students, parents, and members of the public might
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”48 The
Court reasoned that a school should be afforded greater control over
school-sponsored speech because it should be allowed to dissociate
itself from speech that is, among other things, inadequate, inappropriate, or profane.49 The Court stated that “[a] school must be able to
set high standards for the student speech that is disseminated under
its auspices—standards that may be higher than those demanded . . .
in the ‘real’ world—and may refuse to disseminate student speech
that does not meet those standards.”50 Thus, even though Hazelwood
dealt with—in the Court’s opinion—a different type of student
speech, the Court nonetheless effectively amended and shrunk the
mostly protective standard in Tinker.
Then, in 2007, the Supreme Court decided its most recent case
involving students and free speech protections. In Morse v. Frederick,51 school officials suspended a student after he displayed a banner
that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”52 The student displayed the banner at school-sponsored activity that was attended by students and
other members of the public.53 The Court worked through a lengthy
discussion about the ambiguity of the phrase “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”54 The school officials argued that it was clearly a message
meant to promote the use of drugs and thus an endorsement of an
illegal activity.55 The Court noted that the student’s best argument
was that the message essentially meant nothing and was merely
“ ‘meaningless and funny.’ ”56 But, Chief Justice Roberts stated that
even if the meaning of the phrase was debatable, it still contained an
“undeniable reference to illegal drugs.”57 Notably, the student raised
another argument that the dissent found persuasive. The student
argued that even if the message did have a clear and shocking meaning, he only intended it to get him on television.58 However, Chief
Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, responded by stating that
an explanation for the student’s motive was a separate matter from
an interpretation of the message on the banner.59 If the student’s


47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 270-71.
Id. at 271.
Id.
Id. at 271-72.
551 U.S. 393 (2007).
Id. at 397.
Id.
Id. at 400-03.
Id. at 401-02.
Id. at 402 (quoting Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2006)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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speech does not qualify for First Amendment protection, the fact that
the student harbored a harmless motivation does not matter.
The Court held that the school had not violated the student’s
rights because the banner was speech that was not protected by the
First Amendment.60 In reaching this conclusion, the Court focused on
the reasonableness of the principal’s actions in response to the banner.61 The Court stated that it was reasonable to interpret the phrase
as promoting illegal drug use.62 Thus, the Court held that a principal
may restrict a student’s speech at a school event if that speech “is
reasonably viewed as promoting drug use.”63 The Court cited Tinker
but noted that while a dissenting opinion raised the issue of political
speech,64 neither party had claimed that the banner expressed a political viewpoint, thus making Tinker mostly inapplicable.65 Accordingly, the Court seemed to work within the more restrictive framework of Fraser and reconfirmed the view that students’ free speech
protections must be applied with an understanding of the unique nature of the school environment.66 However, the Court also made an
interesting admission, stating that “[t]he mode of analysis employed
in Fraser is not entirely clear.”67 The Court indicated that Fraser
acknowledged that both the content of the speech and the manner of
the speech (or its forum) must be examined when determining if the
speech in question is protected under the First Amendment and that
adults and children are treated differently in this context.68 Although
the Court in Fraser did distinguish the lewd speech from the political
armbands in Tinker, Chief Justice Roberts stated that Fraser also did
not expressly follow the substantial disruption analysis that Tinker
supposedly required.69 The Court noted that since the banner was not
school-sponsored speech, Hazelwood did not apply.70 Thus, Chief Justice Robert’s majority opinion did not radically change the framework
for student speech protections under the First Amendment, but it
opened a debate concerning what Tinker does and does not prescribe
and what analysis Fraser actually employed.71
Notably, the Court produced two concurring opinions in addition
to Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion. Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion, stated that he approved of adding another exception


60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 400.
Id. at 401-03.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 425-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 402-03.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 404.
Id.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 405-06.
See SCHNEIDER, supra note 7, at 217-23 (Supp. 2011).
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to the Tinker analysis but would have preferred to “dispense with
Tinker altogether, and given the opportunity, [he] would do so.”72 In
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, he indicated his belief that the
Court’s decision was quite narrow.73 Justice Alito did not think the
Court’s decision created any restrictions on political speech, nor did it
expand any preexisting restrictions on student speech.74
B. The Erosion of Tinker or a Standard of Deference?
Tinker has long been viewed as the “high-water mark” of First
Amendment protections for student free speech.75 However, the Supreme Court’s decision and reasoning in Morse represented the third
time in as many opportunities that the Court chose to apply a more
restrictive standard of free speech protection for students.76 Instead
of viewing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence as evolving away from
a more protective standard of student speech, some observers have
argued it may be more helpful to understand Tinker as it has operated over time instead of how it was initially received.77 In other words,
instead of student speech being a story of the erosion of Tinker,78 it
has in fact always been about deference to the reasonable judgments
of school officials.79 A recent useful example of deference towards
school officials can be found in Christian Legal Society Chapter v.
Martinez.80 The Court was quite deferential to the University of California Hastings College of Law after it decided to reject the Christian
Legal Society’s application to become a registered student organization.81 The group included discriminatory membership guidelines in
the group’s bylaws and wanted to receive the school funding and access to school facilities that came with being a recognized student
organization.82 In siding with the school’s decision to deny the application, the Court reiterated that school officials may impose restrictions on speech that are reasonable when factors such as forum
and the impact of the restrictions are considered.83



72. Morse, 551 U.S. at 422 (Thomas, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 422-24 (Alito, J., concurring).
75. Sean R. Nuttall, Rethinking the Narrative on Judicial Deference in Student Speech
Cases, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1282, 1282 (2008).
76. See id. at 1282-88.
77. Id. at 1284-88.
78. Id. at 1285-88; see also Morse, 551 U.S. at 422 (Thomas, J., concurring).
79. Nuttall, supra note 75, at 1285.
80. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
81. Id. at 2987-91.
82. Id. at 2978-81.
83. Id. at 2987-91.
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III. FREE SPEECH FOR COLLEGE STUDENTS
A. A Higher Standard, Hosty, or Neither?
The Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed whether a college student’s speech should be protected more, less, or no differently
than a high school student’s speech.84 However, in Healy v. James,85
the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the Central
Connecticut State College’s decision not to allow the Students for a
Democratic Society to be recognized as an official campus organization.86 The Court held that the college violated the students’ First
Amendment rights and noted that “the precedents of this Court leave
no room for the view that, because of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at large.”87 Additionally, for
many years after Tinker, lower federal courts consistently recognized
a higher level of speech protection for college students—especially
when the speech involved student-run publications.88 Repeatedly,
lower courts have stated that a public university violates a student’s
First Amendment speech protections when the university disciplines
a student simply because it does not approve of the speech’s content.89 Throughout those cases, a clear theme emerged—when applying the substantial disturbance test from Tinker, discomfort or disagreement on behalf of the school officials could not constitute a substantial disturbance to school operations.90 However, the Supreme
Court then decided Hazelwood and Fraser in the years following
Tinker and Healey. Both of those cases cut into the Tinker standard
of significant speech protection, and Hazelwood specifically addressed a high school newspaper.91 But since Hazelwood clearly reduced free speech protections for high school students, observers felt
comfortable that nothing in Hazelwood indicated the Supreme
Court’s desire for it to spread to college newspapers.92 By all accounts, those predictions proved quite accurate until, in Hosty v.



84. See Jessica B. Lyons, Note, Defining Freedom of the College Press after Hosty v.
Carter, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1771, 1774 (2006).
85. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
86. Id. at 170-71.
87. Id. at 180.
88. See Lyons, supra note 84, at 1778.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 1777-78 (discussing Stanley v. Magrath, 719 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1983); Schiff
v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975); and Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Colo.
1971)).
91. See supra Part II.A.
92. Lyons, supra note 84, at 1780 (quoting STUDENT PRESS LAW CTR., LAW OF THE
STUDENT PRESS 56 (2d ed. 1994), for the editor’s confident assertion that it would be
unlikely for Hazelwood to apply to college publications, as a court would have to ignore or
overrule more than twenty years of First Amendment precedent).
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Carter,93 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied Hazelwood to
allow the administrators of a public university to restrict student
speech in a school-sponsored publication and discipline students for
speech that did not merit the university’s approval.94 The court in
Hosty offered a surprising rationale for why Hazelwood should be
considered the appropriate analysis for restricting universitysponsored publications.95 While the Hazelwood Court devoted substantial time and effort to considering the effect the speech would
have on other students or whether the speech was inappropriate considering the students’ maturity level, the court in Hosty instead chose
to force the Hazelwood analysis into a discussion distinguishing public forums from private forums.96 The students argued that the notion
of different types of speech being appropriate for different maturity
levels has played a key role in determining whether to restrict student speech.97 The students also argued that the consideration of different maturity levels played a key role in courts hesitating to expand high school-type restrictions to college campuses.98 However,
the court made the fairly nonsensical claim that “there is no sharp
difference between high school and college papers.”99 Under this reasoning, the next logical step is that there is no difference in maturity
levels between high school and college students, and their speech
should be restricted in the same ways. Not only are there decades of
case law that disagree with this rationale, there is another area of
First Amendment jurisprudence that closely mirrors free speech in
how it places substantial emphasis on age and maturity level.100
B. Establishment Clause Comparison
As noted above, the Court in Hazelwood based a large portion of
its reasoning on the notion that a school official is in the best position
to make a reasonable determination as to whether the content of a
school-sponsored publication is either inappropriate for its readership or represents the school in a poor way.101 Aside from examining
the official’s judgment, a key portion of that test is predicated on the
understanding that middle and high school students are not of the
same age or maturity level as adults, and this difference is a sensible
reason to allow speech restrictions in certain cases.102 It should be


93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 733-34.
Lyons, supra note 84, at 1792-93.
Hosty, 412 F.3d at 735-38.
Id. at 734-35.
Id.
Id. at 735; see also Lyons, supra note 84, at 1798.
Lyons, supra note 84, at 1796-97.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-76 (1988).
Id. at 271-72; see also Lyons, supra note 84, at 1796.
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understood that the Court’s concern regarding student speech and
maturity level did not spontaneously reappear in Hazelwood. On the
contrary, the Court decided Fraser after weighing the reality that the
particular speech involved was not necessarily inappropriate outside
of school but that the special nature of the school environment made
the lewd and offensive speech inappropriate and subject to restriction.103 This special nature is produced by several factors—
pedagogical concerns being prominent among them—but a key concern is the maturity levels of middle and high school students.104
Likewise, Establishment Clause jurisprudence has a long history
of factoring in students’ various maturity levels when deciding
whether the clause bars the establishment of religion at schools of
various educational levels.105 In Tilton v. Richardson,106 the Supreme
Court addressed whether the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963
violated the Establishment Clause because it granted federal government funding to some colleges that were related to churches.107 In
the plurality opinion, the Court stated that one of the reasons it was
less concerned about religious indoctrination at the college level was
because college students, by virtue of their age and maturity level,
were simply less impressionable and less likely to be caught up in
religious indoctrination.108 Conversely, in Lee v. Weisman,109 the Supreme Court ruled that a middle school violated the Establishment
Clause when it brought in clergymen to deliver nonsectarian prayers.110 Justice Kennedy, writing for the plurality, noted that part of
the Court’s rationale was based on widely accepted psychological research showing that adolescents are often heavily influenced by peer
pressure to conform with others’ beliefs and behaviors.111 Thus, the
Supreme Court, with respect to another First Amendment right, has
made a clear determination that age and maturity level should be
weighed when determining how and when rights of students will be
protected or restricted. More importantly, the Court has indicated
that the conclusion this determination reaches is one of different
treatment for high school students than college students.112 It is useful to note the analogous rationales found in pre-Hosty student



103. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684-85 (1986).
104. Id.
105. Lyons, supra note 84, at 1796.
106. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
107. Id. at 674-75. The Court examined four issues in the case, determined that only
one part of the Act was unconstitutional, and did not strike down the entire Act. 403 U.S.
at 689. See also Lyons, supra note 84, at 1796.
108. Id. at 686.
109. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
110. Id. at 587-90.
111. Id. at 593-94.
112. Lyons, supra note 84, at 1796.
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speech jurisprudence and Establishment Clause jurisprudence.113 Finally, when Hosty is reexamined with this connection in mind, its
reasoning appears increasingly tenuous.114
IV. ONLINE STUDENT SPEECH: A PATCHWORK DOCTRINE
To date, the Supreme Court has not come close to addressing
the discussion of what protections exist for online student
speech.115 However, the Supreme Court has addressed general
online speech, and many lower federal courts have been forced to
decide cases involving online student speech. 116 An examination of
those cases offers some indications as to whether bans on studentathletes from using social media are unconstitutional.
In Reno v. ACLU,117 the Supreme Court held that online speech is
no different than other speech and requires full protection under the
First Amendment.118 The suit was brought in response to the passage
of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which Congress intended to effectively restrict indecent adult online speech so minors would
not be exposed to such content while surfing the Internet.119 In support of its holding, the Court described in great detail the pervasive
nature of the Internet in the increasingly technological and connected
world.120 The Court concluded by stating that online speech is “ ‘the
most participatory form of mass speech yet developed.’ ”121
In the arena of online student speech, the lower courts have been
left to grasp for conclusions with little to no guidance from the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the courts have drawn a few distinctions
in student speech that they believe are meaningful: off-campus online
speech versus on-campus online speech, online speech brought on
campus by the speaker versus online speech brought on campus by
another student, and online speech which may foreseeably be
brought on campus versus online speech that cannot foreseeably be
brought on campus.122
Interestingly, the lower courts have been in near agreement that
the Tinker substantial disruption test is the appropriate analysis for



113. Id.
114. See, e.g., id.
115. See, e.g., Allison E. Hayes, From Armbands to Douchebags: How Doninger v.
Niehoff Shows the Supreme Court Needs to Address Student Speech in the Cyber Age, 43
AKRON L. REV. 247, 255, 271 (2010).
116. Id. at 255-62.
117. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
118. Id. at 849; see also Hayes, supra note 115, at 256.
119. Reno, 521 U.S. at 849-59.
120. Id. at 849-53.
121. Id. at 863 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
122. Hayes, supra note 115, at 256-60.
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online student speech.123 The substantial disruption test is best suited for a majority of the types of online student speech that have come
under the courts’ review.124 Among these online student speech cases,
restrictions on speech were upheld where the school officials could
show that the speech either actually caused a substantial disruption
to school operations, was very likely to cause a substantial disruption
when the school officials intervened, or was dangerous.125 Essentially,
the various distinctions mentioned above (on-campus online speech
versus off-campus online speech, etc.) proved to have less to do with
the overall analysis of the case and more to do with the way the
courts framed the facts.126 Ultimately, while school officials may have
had to show more cause in order to satisfy the substantial disruption
test if another student brought the speech to campus or if the speech
had not even been brought to campus at all, the substantial disruption test remained as the threshold question.127 Since, as described
earlier, the Tinker test affords significant latitude to high school officials in determining what is a reasonable response to a substantial
disruption, that threshold likely was not raised significantly higher.
When the schools have simply stated that they did not approve of the
student speech in question, the courts have usually turned to the
rhetoric of strong protections for student speech found in Tinker and
have held that the students’ rights had been violated.128 But when the



123. See id.
124. A brief review of the Supreme Court’s student speech cases (where the speech did
not occur on the internet) illustrates the utility of the Tinker test. Morse appears to apply
narrowly to student speech that advocates illegal drug use. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S.
393, 403 (2007); see Hayes, supra note 115, at 255. Hazelwood applies to school-sponsored
student speech. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-73 (1987). Fraser
applies to “offensively lewd and indecent speech.” Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 685 (1985).
125. Hayes, supra note 115, at 256-60. See also Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d
34, 38-40 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that a student, who created digital icon on his personal
computer that portrayed one person shooting another person and implied that the person
being shot was the school principal, would have likely caused a substantial disruption if
the icon had been viewed by administrators on school grounds); Layshock v. Hermitage
Sch. Dist., 412 F. Supp. 2d 502, 508 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (holding that a student caused a substantial disruption of school operations when he posted offensive and false information
about the school principal, causing the school to shut down its computer system for five
days); J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 869 (Pa. 2002) (holding that a student-created website, which graphically portrayed ways an algebra teacher should die,
caused a substantial disruption because the teacher suffered emotional injuries and feared
for her safety).
126. See Hayes, supra note 115, at 256-60.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 286-87. See also Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446,
458 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that a school could not suspend a student for writing a lewd
and offensive email about the school’s athletic director because the email did not cause any
disturbance of school operations); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088,
1089-90 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (holding that a school could not expel a student for creating a
website that a local news report erroneously labeled a “hit list” because the website was
not viewed on campus and did not cause a substantial disruption); Beussink v. Woodland
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schools argued that the speech had or would cause a substantial disruption, focusing the discussion on the reasonableness of their judgment as school officials, the courts have upheld the restrictions on
student speech.129 This clear division in arguments that do or do not
persuade courts to enforce restrictions on student speech highlights
two key flaws in applying Tinker to online student speech. First,
Tinker has—over time—allowed courts to be too deferential to school
officials to judge what type of speech will or does cause a substantial
disruption.130 School officials are inclined to err on the side of restricting speech in favor of maintaining order and also insufficiently qualified to receive such considerable deference on an issue concerning
First Amendment rights. In West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette,131 the Supreme Court made clear that such extensive deference undermines the role of courts.132 The Court stated that it
“cannot, because of modest estimates of our competence in such specialties as public education, withhold the judgment that history authenticates as the function of this Court when liberty is infringed.”133
Second, the lower courts’ distinctions between where online speech
originates and who causes that speech to appear on campus have
proven unhelpful. This is likely due in large part to the reality that
the medium for that speech is the most pervasive, universal, and easily accessible method of communication in human history. These unhelpful distinctions illustrate why the Tinker test for online student
speech is both outdated and insufficient.
V. STUDENT-ATHLETES BANNED FROM USING SOCIAL MEDIA
A. Current Landscape in College Athletics
Now another form of speech has emerged that is changing the way
individuals communicate with one another, share ideas, and express
themselves. The emergence and ubiquitous nature of social media
has arguably impacted every facet of modern life, collegiate athletics
included. At the same time, the world of collegiate athletics has become increasingly commercialized, highly lucrative for some
schools,134 and a boon for major conferences and broadcasting compa-



R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1179-80 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (holding that a school could
not suspend a student for creating a website that was very critical—and used offensive
language—of the school’s administration solely on the basis that the website upset the
school’s principal).
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
132. See id. at 640.
133. Id.
134. See generally Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Oct. 2011, at 80; Editorial, College Sports: Boola Boola vs. Moola Moola, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
17, 2011, at A14.
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nies in the form of television rights agreements worth billions of dollars.135 Perhaps the best example of this booming market is the newly
launched Longhorn Network, a television network created by the
University of Texas and ESPN that exclusively televises University
of Texas athletics and is reportedly worth 300 million dollars.136 Additionally, coaches’ salaries in major sports like football and basketball have exploded in recent years.137 Many college football and basketball coaches earn more than one million dollars a year, and in a
few instances, even some assistant football coaches earn salaries that
dwarf those of high school coaches and college coaches in other, less
visible sports.138 This relatively sudden influx of money into collegiate
athletics has played a key role in creating stronger competition
among coaches and schools.139 One product of this competition is the
desire among coaches to exert the utmost control over their programs
in hopes of winning as many games as possible.
Athletic department fundraising concerns are another source that
creates demand for on-field success. In 2010, a report showed that
only 14 of the 120 athletic departments in the Football Bowl Subdivision made a profit in the previous year.140 The report showed that the
only two sports that made money for schools were football and men’s
basketball and that more football programs were profitable than
men’s basketball programs.141 However, as the study shows, only a
few universities have football programs and men’s basketball programs that are profitable enough to pay for and exceed the costs of
the other sports and the athletic department as a whole.142 These two
sports and the revenues they bring in invariably come under closer
scrutiny when school officials examine budgetary issues. Therefore,
school administrators have an incentive to support whatever policies
the coaches deem important for success, because that success equals
more notoriety, more ticket sales, more alumni donations, and more
revenue. When such large sums of money are on the line, school ad-
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College
Teams
Scramble for a Spot, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/sports/
ncaafootball/in-conference-realignment-colleges-run-to-paydaylight.html?pagewanted=all.
136. Aaron Kuriloff & David Mildenberg, ESPN Longhorn Network Cash Tips College Sports
into Disarray, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK. (Nov. 10, 2011, 6:12 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/
news/2011-11-10/espn-longhorn-network-cash-tips-college-sports-into-disarray.html.
137. Erik Brady et al., Salaries for College Football Coaches Back on Rise, USA TODAY
(Nov. 17, 2011, 11:02 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/story/2011-1117/
cover-college-football-coaches-salaries-rise/51242232/1.
138. Gary Klein & Bill Dwyre, Auburn’s Gus Malzahn Says He’s in No Hurry to Become
a Head Coach, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at C7.
139. See, e.g., Ralph Friedgen Out at Maryland, ESPN.COM (Dec. 23, 2010, 2:29 PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5938838.
140. Associated Press, NCAA Report: Economy Cuts into Sports, ESPN.COM (Aug. 23,
2010, 7:28 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5490686.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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ministrators are inclined to allow—even actively support—studentathlete speech restrictions. This desire is manifested in many different policies, and one of them has been bans on social media.
B. Examples of Bans on Social Media
Several athletic departments of public universities have banned
student-athletes within those departments from speaking through
social media.143 The Mississippi State University men’s basketball
team and the New Mexico State University men’s basketball team
have implemented bans on social media.144 Both of those bans are
still in effect.145 The University of Georgia men’s basketball program
enforced a ban on social media for one season, but has recently lifted
the ban.146 A larger number of public schools have banned college
football players from using social media. Their teams are as follows:
the University of South Carolina Gamecocks,147 the Boise State University Broncos,148 the University of Iowa Hawkeyes,149 and the University of Kansas Jayhawks.150 Admittedly, bans on only a handful of
public university teams may not appear to indicate that similar bans
will spread. However, that is a false reading. Social media is a recent
phenomenon, and considering the exponential growth of attention
that collegiate athletics demand, the possibility that bans on studentathletes from using social media could proliferate is much more likely.
C. Why Student-Athletes Are Banned from Using Social Media
Recent studies have shown that an overwhelming majority of college students and young adults use social media websites.151 Notably,
no public universities have banned the general student body from
using social media. While this discrepancy in treatment among col-



143. Shear, supra note 1.
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lege students who are members of school athletic teams and those
students who are not is possibly sufficient evidence of a violation of
First Amendment rights, the reasons that school officials and college
coaches have offered for the bans are even more transparent.
In August 2011, Steve Spurrier, the head coach of the South Carolina Gamecocks football team, banned his players from using Twitter.152 A few players had made offensive statements on their Twitter
accounts that had begun to draw negative attention to the football
program.153 That media attention caused Spurrier to address the issue.154 First, it is noteworthy that the players’ online speech is the
type that would be protected under the standard that the Supreme
Court created in Reno v. ACLU.155 Spurrier, when asked by reporters
why he had banned his players from using Twitter, said, “Well, we
have some dumb, immature players that put crap on their Twitter,
and we don’t need that. So the best thing to do is just ban it . . . .”156
Another example is found in a statement made by Turner Gill, head
coach of the Kansas Jayhawks football team, also in August 2011. At
the press conference in which he announced the ban on his football
team from using Twitter, he stated, “The reason we decided to not allow our players to have a Twitter account is we feel like it will prevent
us from being able to prepare our football program to move forward.
Simple as that.”157
Each school and coach has offered this type of rationale for
banning student-athletes from using social media. 158 The motivations for restricting student-athlete’s speech are easy to discern.
Schools and coaches wish to avoid negative attention and embarrassment. They want student-athletes to create a positive image
of the school and the team and are willing to censor studentathletes to achieve this end even if it may be unconstitutional.
They also have a strong interest in supporting policies that
achieve on-field results at the expense of other important values—like constitutionally protected student speech.



152. Cloninger, supra note 147.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997). In Reno, the Court held that adult online speech should
receive full protection under the First Amendment—even if the speech is indecent—
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simplified way, it is nothing more than online speech made by an adult. I only raise this
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156. Cloninger, supra note 147 (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. KU Notebook, supra note 150 (internal quotation marks omitted).
158. See, e.g., Cloninger, supra note 147; KU Notebook, supra note 150; Rovell, supra
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While varied, these reasons have a commonality: schools and
coaches consider speech by student-athletes to be a privilege, not a
right. And when that speech raises the possibility of embarrassment
or poor play in games, many schools and coaches have chosen harsh
bans on protected speech instead of choosing constructive policies.
Universities and coaches should implement policies aimed at teaching student-athletes that some types of speech—while constitutionally protected—may not be in the best interests of the team.
However, there is potentially another reason why schools and
coaches have been, and will continue to be, motivated to ban studentathletes from using social media. They need not look any further
than the cautionary tale that is the University of North Carolina
men’s football team. In May 2010, then-North Carolina football player Marvin Austin made a handful of late-night posts on his Twitter
account.159 The posts were cryptic but seemed to indicate that he was
at LIV (a posh Miami nightclub) and was enjoying bottle service.160
NCAA rules regarding student-athletes receiving improper benefits
are detailed and strict.161 By July, the NCAA had interviewed Austin
and other North Carolina football players regarding whether they
received any improper benefits from school boosters or sports
agents.162 In response, North Carolina suspended Austin indefinitely
for the entire 2010-11 season.163 Additionally, North Carolina declared seven other football players ineligible for at least one game
and did not allow an additional six players to play in the first game
while both the school and the NCAA continued their investigations.164
Ultimately, the NCAA found evidence that several North Carolina
football players had received improper benefits.165 The NCAA also
found evidence that some North Carolina football players had committed academic fraud.166 When the dust finally settled, several
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North Carolina football players lost substantial portions of their athletic eligibility, head coach Butch Davis was fired, and Athletic Director Dick Baddour resigned.167 Had Austin’s Twitter posts not caught
the eye of the NCAA, it seems safe to assume that the NCAA’s spotlight would not have been focused on the North Carolina football
program, and the many other violations would have gone unnoticed
and unreported.
When the NCAA sent its Notice of Allegations to North Carolina
on June 21, 2011, one allegation in particular stood out for the purposes of this Note.168 In allegation No. 9(b), the NCAA alleged: “In
February through June 2010, the institution did not adequately and
consistently monitor social networking activity that visibly illustrated potential amateurism violations within the football program
ǤǤǤǤ”169 This marked the first time that the NCAA either openly described a duty to monitor student-athletes’ social media accounts or
alleged that a school had failed to meet its duty.170 It does not require
any imagination to perceive the shock waves that this new policy
sent through collegiate athletics. Was it simply a coincidence that the
South Carolina, Kansas, and Iowa football programs all implemented
bans on social media only a few weeks after the NCAA punished
North Carolina for not monitoring its student-athletes’ Twitter accounts? Or is it more likely that schools would rather implement
wholesale restrictions on student speech than open themselves up to
NCAA scrutiny? The latter seems decidedly more plausible.
VI. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BANS UNDER CURRENT FRAMEWORK
Are public universities unconstitutionally restricting the First
Amendment speech rights of student-athletes when those universities ban social media? For the purposes of this Note, this question
will be applied within the framework of the Tinker test. There are
many reasons why the Tinker substantial disruption standard should
be applied instead of the other student-speech tests. First, speech
through the medium of social media is online speech. As discussed
above, lower federal courts have been mostly consistent in their
judgment to apply Tinker to online speech instead of the other student-speech tests.171 Second, while the college student-speech versus
grade school student-speech distinction has produced a separate ju-
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risprudence with the application of other tests, the cases that comprise that area of law have largely involved school-sponsored newspapers or student organizations seeking the official approval of the
school.172 Additionally, there are readily identifiable complications
with applying the frameworks of the other cases.
Fraser does not apply as aptly as Tinker in large part because it
applies narrowly to a student’s lewd and offensive speech in the setting of a school program or event.173 And, as discussed above, federal
courts have consistently applied Tinker to online student speech instead of Fraser.174 Morse does not apply as aptly as Tinker because it
applies narrowly to student speech that promotes illegal drug use.175
However, it is arguable that the Hazelwood analysis (student speech
made under the imprimatur of the school) could apply to studentathlete speech via online social media. Accordingly, the following is a
short discussion of potential arguments for applying Hazelwood instead of Tinker.
Schools could potentially make the argument that student-athletes
bear the imprimatur of the school since they represent the school in athletic competition. However, this argument is flawed because the speech
that the schools are restricting is spoken through the students’ personal
social media accounts and not speech spoken while the students are participating in a game or when the students are speaking to the media on
behalf of the team and the university. The student-athletes’ social media
accounts identify the students as individuals and not as the school or
the team, or a mouthpiece for either. Moreover, many schools and many
coaches also have social media accounts through which they make announcements and interact with the public.176 If certain accounts should
be considered the mouthpiece for a school or athletic program, surely
these accounts are more reasonable examples.
Additionally, the schools may argue that the student-athletes bear
the imprimatur of the school because they receive school funding in
the form of athletic scholarships. This argument also fails because
many college students receive funding in the form of various scholarships and grants, and those students are not banned, and could not
be banned, from using social media websites because such a policy
would be an unconstitutional infringement on their First Amendment rights. In Perry v. Sindermann,177 a state junior college professor challenged the college’s decision not to rehire him after he publicly criticized the school.178 The Supreme Court held that even if a
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person has no right to a governmental benefit, that person cannot be
denied that benefit on a basis that violates her constitutionally protected right of free speech.179 The Court reasoned that “if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally
protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would
in effect be penalized and inhibited.”180 Thus, it is incorrect to connect
a student-athlete’s acceptance of an athletic scholarship from a public
university with a requirement that she also forfeit First Amendment
free speech rights.
Lastly, applying the Hazelwood test, as the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals did in Hosty, has been met with sufficient criticism—
applying a standard originating in a case dealing with the speech of
students in high school as opposed to the speech of students in college—that it makes its applicability to this topic less likely.181 Thus,
this Note analyzes the constitutionality of social media bans on student-athletes under the Tinker test.
A. Social Media Bans on Student-Athletes Are Unconstitutional
Under Tinker
Under the substantial disruption test found in Tinker, public universities unconstitutionally restrict the First Amendment speech
rights of student-athletes when they ban those students from using
social media. In order for these bans to be constitutional, the schools
and coaches would have to show that the banned speech either has
disrupted or would substantially disrupt school operations. Tinker
has almost always been applied to school settings, used to evaluate
whether the speech caused a substantial disruption to the institution’s educational objectives. Are the things that student-athletes
say on their social media profiles so inciting as to cause a substantial disruption of the universities’ pedagogical concerns? Or is it
more likely that the speech will most often go unnoticed? And in the
few instances that such speech does get noticed, it may only raise
athletic ineligibility issues—issues separate from the pedagogical
concerns of the school since a student-athlete’s enrollment in the school
is unaffected by his or her continued participation in collegiate sports.
Additionally, there do not appear to be any instances in which
something a student-athlete said on her social media account caused
any protests, led to the cancellation of classes, or affected the school’s
educational environment in any noticeable ways. Also, the studentathletes’ social media speech has not violated any other person’s



179. Id. at 597-98.
180. Id. at 597.
181. Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Lyons, supra note 84,
1796-98.

802

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:781

rights. In only a few instances has the student-athlete speech that
ultimately caused a ban been speech that was offensive or lewd.182
Moreover, that type of speech is protected speech on college campuses
when the speech does not bear the imprimatur of the school, which
student-athlete speech does not.
In contrast, the public universities and coaches have usually explained that the bans were necessary because a student-athlete had
posted something that the university found embarrassing or that the
university or coach simply did not agree with.183 These explanations are
very similar to the online student speech cases in which the school
officials did not show evidence of a substantial disruption. Instead,
the officials argued that it was not an unconstitutional restriction on
the students’ speech because they found the speech distasteful or disagreeable.184 And since the courts should defer to the school officials’
judgment in school matters, it was not unconstitutional when the officials restricted student speech they found inappropriate—or so the
school officials argued.
In those cases, however, the courts held that when there was no
substantial disruption, school officials violated the student’s First
Amendment free speech rights when they restricted the speech or
punished the students.185 Like the schools in those cases, these public
universities and coaches are banning student-athletes from using
social media because they do not like what a few student-athletes
sometimes say. Like the schools in those cases, these school officials
and coaches can only rely on deference to their judgment because
they have not shown that a student-athlete has caused a substantial
disruption in the school environment through social media use.
Under the Tinker substantial disruption test, these bans on social
media use are unconstitutional. University officials and coaches have
not offered an example of a student-athlete causing a substantial disruption in the school environment through social media use. None of
the student-athletes who were banned from using social media had
used it to infringe on another student’s rights prior to the bans being
implemented. Clearly, these bans on social media by public universities are motivated by concerns over image control and interests in further success in a multi-billion dollar industry—concerns that are
glossed over with rhetoric trumpeting the privilege of being a collegiate athlete. Unfortunately, these bans are implemented with little
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protest because, of all the parties involved, the student-athletes are in
the weakest position to refuse these constitutional infringements.
B. A Narrowly-Tailored Test Is More Reasonable
Since it is very possible that team-wide and season-long bans are
unconstitutional infringements on student-athletes’ First Amendment rights, public universities and their athletic coaches should instead choose policies that would pass a narrowly tailored test. While
the current types of bans are likely unconstitutional under Tinker, it
is also possible that the Tinker test is an insufficient standard for
this uniquely twenty-first century speech. Accordingly, when deciding the constitutionality of certain restrictions on social media, courts
should decide whether those restrictions are significantly and narrowly tailored so as to not constitute an undue restriction on studentathletes’ rights of free speech.
Universities and coaches could combine minimal restrictions on
social media with educational programs aimed at teaching studentathletes about the potential pitfalls of rash or offensive social media
speech. Administrators and coaches could choose to implement social
media bans for shorter periods of time instead of banning use for the
entire season. Depending on the sport, some seasons can last longer
than five months. Instead, coaches might only ban social media use
twenty-four hours before and after a competitive event. This “quiet
period” would assist coaches and programs in maintaining focus and
avoiding embarrassing distractions on the eve of a competition, while
also not silencing student-athletes for entire semesters.
Another policy that could satisfy a narrowly tailored test would be
one that only restricted the student-athletes from discussing certain
topics or subjects on their social media accounts. Such subjects could
include statements that advocate for either illegal activities or violations of the university’s or college’s academic honor code. Another
subject could include sensitive information that would give athletic
opponents a competitive edge, as such information could ultimately
bring some degree of harm to fellow teammates. One more example is
if a student-athlete makes embarrassing or offensive comments while
clearly attempting to speak on behalf of the university or team. These
examples illustrate the reasonableness and utility of a narrowly tailored test because it addresses the conflict created by the dual, competing interests that lie at the heart of this matter: the interest in
allowing school administrators and coaches to employ some reasonable measures of control to maintain order and the interest in protecting students’ First Amendment free speech rights.
Additionally, this facet of a narrowly tailored test would adequately reflect what the Establishment Clause cases have borne out over
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time—that college students are at a higher maturity level than high
school students. College students are more mature and their speech
should not be restricted to the same extent as high school students.
Likewise, a policy that only restricts social media use for short, specific windows of time instead of season long bans also acknowledges
college students’ higher maturity level. College students are mature
enough and capable of following such guidelines. They should be allowed the opportunity to exercise discretion that this narrowly tailored
rule permits, instead of being unduly censored by season long bans.
A narrowly tailored test acknowledges that student-athletes—
often between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two and living away
from home for the first time—sometimes say things that bring negative attention to their universities. It is an unfortunate reality that
the increased notoriety of collegiate athletes makes it easier for their
speech to garner negative attention than other students might otherwise would. And, though it is rare, there have been examples of
some student-athletes who have brought frequent embarrassment to
themselves and to their universities without much remorse.186 A narrowly tailored test would likely permit universities to ban such repeat offenders and reckless individuals from using social media while
they are participating in collegiate athletics. In contrast, a narrowly
tailored test would not allow blanket bans on student-athletes whose
speech had never caused controversy and who may have chosen a different school had they been aware of the possibility of these social
media bans before enrolling.
Under either the Tinker substantial disruption test or a narrowly
tailored test, these team-wide and season-long social media bans are
likely violations of the student-athletes’ First Amendment speech
rights. However, adopting a narrowly tailored test to be applied to
student-athletes’ First Amendment rights would represent a meaningful effort towards protecting their speech and expression during a
highly influential time in their lives.
VII. CONCLUSION
The recent bans on social media speech that public universities
and college coaches have forced on student-athletes are likely unconstitutional. The Tinker substantial disruption test only allows school
officials to restrict student speech if the speech causes, or would foreseeably cause, a substantial disruption in the school environment. To
date, no student-athlete’s social media speech has caused a substantial disruption in the school environment. However, the substantial
disruption test is likely ill-suited for speech communicated through



186. Maurice Clarett Timeline, USATODAY.COM (Apr. 20, 2004, 8:00
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2004-04-20-clarett-timeline_x.htm.

PM),
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the ubiquitous and transformative social media. Social media speech
and its effects raise issues of time and space, and those issues require
a nuanced approach. A narrowly tailored approach would better
serve both the student-athletes and the public universities. It would
allow university officials and coaches to maintain an educational environment that furthers their pedagogical and extracurricular interests. More importantly, it would afford student-athletes stronger free
speech protections than those that already exist.
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